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OSD REVIEWED 08-Mar-2011: NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION

TOP SECRETVZCZCHP863
RUEKJST~~TOP SECRET~~

90320

ACTION NMCCJMC()

SECTS 01 AND 02 OF 90320
AND SECT 79 OF 90320DISTR CJCS(ADM MOORER)(01)1 DJS(GEN SEIGNIOUS)(02)2-3
(001) J3(ADM KING)(01)4 CSA(GEN PALMER)(01)5 CNO(ADM ZUMWALT)(01)6
CSAF(GEN RYAN)(01)7 CMC(GEN CUSHMAN)(01)8 FILE(01)9

ADDED DISTR: J5(GEN SEITH)(1)10 SECDEF(MR. LAIRD)(1)11 DEPSECDEF(MR.

TRANSIT/061218Z/061309Z/00015110R2191256 RUSU(1)12 DIACGEN BENNETT(1)
DE RHMSMVA #9760 2191220 WHOUSECDR. KISSINGER(1)14
ZNY AAAAA PER MR. KEARNEY OJCS 07AUG72O 061218Z AUG 72 ZEP-6
FM COMUSMACV**IMMEDIATE**

TO RUHHHQA/CINCPAC

COPY NR

INFO RUEKJCS/CJCS
BT**SPECIAL-EXCLUSIVE**~~TOP SECRET~~ SPECIAL EXCLUSIVE FOR ADM MCCAIN INFO ADM
MOORER FROM GEN WEYAND, DELIVER DURING WAKING HOURS, SEC 1 OF II.
SUBJECT: SPECIAL ASSESSMENT (U)

REFERENCES:

A, COMUSMACV DTG 101147Z JUL 72 (TS) (SPECIAL) (JCS IN 39342)

B, COMUSMACV DTG 101105Z JUL 72 (TS) (SPECIAL) (JCS IN 51125)

1, (C) THIS MESSAGE REVIEWS THE CURRENT SITUATION IN
THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM AND OUTLINES THE PROSPECTS FOR
THE NEAR TERM.2, (TS) IN MR 4 THE ENEMY CONTINUES TO STRIVE TO
ESTABLISH A GREATER PRESENCE IN THE REGION, HIS EFFORTS
HAVE FOCUSED ON THE TRI-PROVINCE AREA OF KIEN TUONG,
DINH TUONG, AND KIEN PHONG INTO WHICH ELEMENTS OF THE 5TH
VC DIVISION INCLUDING THE DIVISION HEADQUARTERS HAVE INFIL-
TRATED FROM CAMBODIA, ENEMY OBJECTIVES APPEAR TO BE THE
SEIZURE OF SEVERAL DISTRICT TOWNS IN THE OBJECTIVE AREA
AND THE INTERDICTION OF ROUTE 4 WHICH WOULD ISOLATE THE
DELTA FROM THE REMAINDER OF THE REPUBLIC, SHOULD HE
ACCOMPLISH THESE GOALS HE WOULD THEN BE IN A FAVORABLE
POSITION FOR FURTHER EFFORTS TO ESTABLISH INCREASED CON-
TROL OVER THE POPULACE, GENERAL NGHI HAS REACTED TO THE
ENEMY MOVES IN A TIMELY AND EFFECTIVE FASHION BY
REINFORCING IN THE HIGH THREAT AREAS, THE RECENT RETURN
OF THE 21ST DIVISION FROM MR 3 WILL INCREASE HIS CAPA-
BILITY SIGNIFICANTLY, ONE REGT WILL BE READY FOR COMBAT
ON 9 AUGUST FOLLOWED BY A REGT ON 23 AUGUST AND ANOTHER
ON 30 AUGUST, THE 7TH DIVISION HAS BEEN ALERTED FOR
POSSIBLE MOVEMENT TO MR 1 ON OR ABOUT 1 SEPTEMBER, THIS
GIVES SUFFICIENT TIME FOR DEVELOPMENT OF THE SITUATION**TOP SECRET**

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IN THE DELTA AND, CONSEQUENTLY, A MORE VALID JUDGEMENT, WHEN THE TIME COMES, AS TO WHETHER THE 7TH DIVISION SHOULD, IN FACT, BE DEPLOYED TO MR 1. ALTHOUGH THEY HAVE SUFFERED OCCASIONAL SET-BACKS, ARVN AND TERRITORIAL FORCES IN MR 4 HAVE DONE A CREDITABLE JOB OF DEALING WITH THE ENEMY; HOWEVER, RECENT ENEMY REINFORCEMENT WILL MAKE THEIR TASK INCREASINGLY DIFFICULT, ALTHOUGH THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE DELTA INCLUDING ITS RELATIVELY DENSE POPULATION ARE UNFAVORABLE FOR THE MASS APPLICATION OF FIREPOWER, THE SELECTIVE USE OF B-52 STRIKES AND TAC AIR IS FEASIBLE, AND EXCELLENT TARGETTING ALONG WITH GROUND FOLLOW-UP WHICH IS STANDARD PRACTICE IN MR 4 HAVE PRODUCED EXCELLENT RESULTS, THE MAGNITUDE OF THE THREAT IN MR 3 IS RECOGNIZED BY PRESIDENT THIEU AND THE RVNAF LEADERSHIP, GENERAL NGHIS PLAN IS TO APPLY MAXIMUM PRESSURE ON THE ENEMY WHILE HIS TROOP STRENGTH IS HIGH IN ORDER TO BE IN A FAVORABLE POSITION IF IT IS REDUCED, HIS TASK IS A DIFFICULT ONE, BUT BASED UPON PAST PERFORMANCE, HE CAN DO THE JOB IF SUPPORTED ADEQUATELY.

3. (TS) THE SITUATION IN MR 3 REMAINS VIRTUALLY UNCHANGED SINCE THE FORWARDING OF REFERENCE A, HIGHWAY 13 SOUTH OF AN LOC REMAINS INTERDICTIONED BY SMALL ENEMY FORCES AND HAS NOT YET BEEN OPENED TO TRAFFIC, FORCES IN THE TOWN CONTINUE TO RECEIVE LIGHT ATTACKS BY FIRE, THERE HAS BEEN SOME EVIDENCE OF ENEMY ACTIVITY IN NORTHERN TAY NINH PROVINCE; HOWEVER, TIMELY ACTION BY US AIR CAVALRY AND TACTICAL AIR APPEARS TO HAVE INHIBITED ANYTHING SIGNIFICANT AT THIS TIME, MR 3 IS THE ONLY AREA IN WHICH FAIRLY SOLID CONTACT WITH THE ENEMY HAS NOT BEEN MAINTAINED, AS A RESULT, THE LOCATION OF A NUMBER OF ENEMY UNITS IS UNKNOWN AND IS CAUSE FOR CONCERN, I HAVE DISCUSSED THIS WITH PRESIDENT THIEU WHO HAS DIRECTED GENERAL MINH TO PREPARE ONE (25TH) OF THIS THREE DIVISIONS FOR FULLY MOBILE OPERATIONS WITHIN MR3, THIS DIVISION WILL THEN ALSO BE A CANDIDATE FOR POSSIBLE DEPLOYMENT OUT OF MR3 AFTER 1 SEPTEMBER, THIS DIRECTIVE MAY GET III CORPS MOVING AND, IF CARRIED OUT, WILL RESULT IN THE AVAILABILITY OF TWO DIVISIONS FOR REDEPLOYMENT IN LATE AUGUST OR EARLY SEPTEMBER SHOULD THE NEED ARISE.

4. (TS) IN MR2 THE COUNTEROFFENSIVE TO RECOVER THE THREE NORTHERN DISTRICTS IN BINH DINH PROVINCE MET WITH GENERAL SUCCESS AS ALL THREE DISTRICT TOWNS WERE RECAPTURED, AFTER INITIAL EFFORT TO STOP THE ARVN COUNTEROFFENSIVE THE ENEMY

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APPEARS TO HAVE WITHDRAWN AWAY FROM HIGHWAY QL 1, HE RETAINS THE CAPABILITY OF REGAINING THE LOCAL INITIATIVE. HOWEVER, I DO NOT BELIEVE HE WILL BE ABLE TO REVERSE THE OVERALL TREND OF THE GVN COUNTEROFFENSIVE IN NORTHERN BINH DINH HAVING ESTABLISHED CONTROL OF THE DISTRICT TOWNS, II CORPS IS NOW FREE TO ORIENT THE ARVN ON THE ENEMY WHILE USING TERRITORIAL FORCES TO RE-ESTABLISH GVN CONTROL IN THE AREA. IN THE HIGHLANDS, THE ENEMY HAS HARASSED HIGHWAY QL 14 WITH ATTACKS BY FIRE. HOWEVER, THE HIGHWAY REMAINS OPEN TO BOTH CIVILIAN AND MILITARY TRAFFIC, THE WEATHER, REFITTING AND RETRAINING OF 23D DIVISION ELEMENTS, AND TO SOME DEGREE A LACK OF AGGRESSIVENESS HAS RESULTED IN MINIMAL PROGRESS TOWARD RECAPTURING AREAS NORTH AND NORTHWEST OF KONTHUM, THE 320 DIVISION HAS APPARENTLY WITHDRAWN TO BASE AREAS 721/722, WITHIN THE PAST WEEK THERE HAS BEEN INCREASED ENEMY ACTIVITY SOUTHWEST OF PLEIKU WHICH MAY INDICATE THAT THIS DIVISION WILL BECOME A MORE ACTIVE THREAT IN THE PLEIKU-KONTHUM AREA, WE ARE WATCHING DEVELOPMENTS IN THIS AREA CLOSELY.

5. (TS) IN SOUTHERN MR1 THERE IS EVIDENCE OF RENEWED ACTIVITY BY THE NVA 711TH DIVISION WHICH MAY BE REINFORCED BY TANKS AND ARTILLERY, THE ENEMY'S OBJECTIVE IS TO TAKE QUE SON DISTRICT TOWN AND THEN MOVE INTO THE LOWLANDS, ELEMENTS OF THE 2ND AND 3RD ARVN DIVISIONS HAVE DEPLOYED TO MEET THE ENEMY AND THE AREA IS BEING AFFORDED HIGH PRIORITY FOR TACAIR AND B-52 TARGETTING IN ORDER TO REDUCE THE THREAT, THE SITUATION APPEARS MANAGEABLE AT THIS POINT BUT MUST BE WATCHED, IN THE QUANG TRI/THUA TINH AREA THE 1 CORPS OFFENSIVE CONTINUES AT A DELIBERATE PACE IN THE FACE OF A REINFORCED ENEMY, THE ARVN 1ST DIVISION HAS TAKEN A LOT OF PUNISHMENT OVER A PROLONGED PERIOD BUT THEY HAVE STUCK WITH IT AND IN RECENT DAYS HAVE REGAINED THE INITIATIVE WITH A RESURGENCE OF AGGRESSIVE PATROLLING AND BATTALION OFFENSIVE ACTION, A REALIGNMENT OF RVNAF FORCES BY GEN TRUONG HAS PLACED THEM IN A BETTER POSITION TO DEAL WITH AN ENEMY COUNTEROFFENSIVE, THE AIRBORNE DIVISION HAVING BEEN RELIEVED OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR QUANG TRI CITY HAS A SMALLER AO AND IS NOW ORIENTED ON THE ENEMY IN THE HIGHER GROUND TO THE WEST OF QL-1 TOWARD OLD BASE AREAS 101 AND 114, ITS MISSION IS TO DEVELOP THE ENEMY AND DESTROY HIM WITH FIREPOWER RATHER THAN ATTEMPT TO SEIZE TERRAIN OBJECTIVES, BY 15 AUG GENERAL TRUONG PLANS TO REDEPLOY HIS FORCES WITH THE MARINE DIVISION ASSIGNED A SECTOR GENERALLY

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SECT 02 OF 90274

90320

ACTION
DISTR NMCCIMC() FILE(1)
(001)

TRANSIT/061210Z/061310Z/000152TOR2191259

DE RHMSMVA #9/61 2191220

ZNY AAAAA

O 061210Z AUG 72 ZFF-6

FM COMUSMACV

TO RUHHHQA/CINCPAC

INFO RUEKJCS/CJCS

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TOP SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR ADM MCCAIN INFO ADM
MOOREH FROM GEN WEYAND, DELIVER DURING WAKING HOURS, FINAL OF !!
BOUNDED BY THE CUA VIET RIVER ON THE NORTH, THE MY CHANH
RIVER ON THE SOUTH, THE SEA
ON THE EAST, AND THE PRESENT LINE OF CONTACT TO THE WEST
AND NORTHWEST, THE AIRBORNE DIVISION WILL BE ASSIGNED
A NARROWER SECTOR FROM THE MY CHANH ON THE NORTH TO A
LINE NORTHWEST OF HUE WHILE THE 1ST DIVISION GENERALLY
RETAINS ITS PRESENT AREA OF OPERATIONS, THIS DISPOSITION
TAKES ADVANTAGE OF THE GREATER COMBAT CAPABILITY OF THE
HEAVY MARINE DIVISION AND CAPITALIZES ON THE MOBILITY
OF THE LIGHTER AIRBORNE DIVISION, GENERAL TRUONG
BELIEVES THAT THE ENEMY WILL ATTEMPT TO ATTACK EITHER
TO CUT HIGHWAY 1 BETWEEN HUE AND QUANG TRI CITY OR
DIRECTLY INTO HUE ASTRIDE HIGHWAY 547, HE IS KEYING HIS
PLANNING AND FORCE DISPOSITION ON THE NVA 312TH DIVISION
WHICH HE EXPECTS WILL APPEAR ON HIS WEST FLANK, RECOG-
NIZING THAT IN SPITE OF PRIORITY INTELLIGENCE EFFORT,
TARGETTING, AND ATTACKS BY B-52 AND TACAIR THE ENEMY
MAY BE ABLE TO MOVE THE 312TH TO SUITABLE ATTACK POSI-
TIONS, GENERAL TRUONG PLANS TO DEFEND DISPOSED AS OUT-
LINED ABOVE, FOLLOWING DEFEAT OF THE ATTACK, I CORPS
WOULD COUNTERATTACK TO THE NORTH AND WEST EMPLOYING THE
AIRBORNE DIVISION AS AN EXPLOITING FORCE, SHOULD
IT BECOME APPARENT THAT THE ENEMY HAS TRIED TO REINFORCE
BUT HIS EFFORTS HAVE BEEN FRUSTRATED BY ALLIED FIREPOWER,
THE AIRBORNE DIVISION WILL BE EMPLOYED IN AN OFFENSIVE
TO THE NORTH AND WEST, WHILE ADDITIONAL FORCES WOULD
FACILITATE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF HIS MISSION GENERAL TRUONG

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HAS DEVELOPED PLANS THAT WOULD PERMIT HIM TO CONTINUE THE OFFENSIVE WITH OR WITHOUT REINFORCEMENT, IN ANY EVENT HE IS PLANNING FOR CONTINUED OPERATIONS DESPITE THE ONSET OF THE MONSOON. THESE OPERATIONS WILL HAVE THE OBJECTIVE OF REGAINING CONTROL OF AT LEAST THE EASTERN PORTION OF QUANG TRI PROVINCE AND COMPLETING THE DESTRUCTION OF ENEMY FORCES IN THAT VITAL SECTOR. MY ANALYSIS SUPPORTS THE FEASIBILITY OF CONTINUING OPERATIONS IN THIS AREA DESPITE THE DIFFICULTIES THAT WILL BE IMPOSED BY THE WEATHER. LOOKING AHEAD THERE IS REASONABLE ASSURANCE OF RETAINING THE INITIATIVE PROVIDED CURRENT LEVELS OF US FIREPOWER REMAIN AVAILABLE. THE PRIMARY DETERRENT TO ARVN SUCCESS IN NORTHERN MR 1 HAS BEEN AND CONTINUES TO BE THE ENEMY ARTILLERY. IN CLOSE COMBAT ENEMY INFANTRY HAS BEEN RELATIVELY

EASY TO DEAL WITH BUT THE VOLUME, TIMELINESS, AND ACCURACY OF HIS ARTILLERY HAVE INHIBITED FRIENDLY FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT AND CONSTITUTE THE MAJOR CAUSE OF FRIENDLY CASUALTIES. US FIRE SUPPORT, INCLUDING NAVAL GUNFIRE, B-52 AND TACAIR STRIKES HAVE PROVIDED THE PRIMARY MEANS OF COPING WITH THIS ASPECT OF THE THREAT. THIS HAS BEEN ACCOMPLISHED BY ATTACKING THE GUNS AND THEIR PRIME MOVERS AND BY INTERDICTION LOC'S AND DESTROYING SUPPLY INSTALLATIONS. WITHOUT THIS SUPPORT THE I CORPS ATTACK WOULD HAVE BOGGED DOWN LONG AGO. WITH A CONTINUING HIGH LEVEL OF US SUPPORT THE RVNAF SHOULD ACHIEVE THEIR OBJECTIVES. THE ENEMY'S APPARENT DECISION TO REINFORCE IN THE NORTH HAS MADE THE IMMEDIATE TASK MORE DIFFICULT AND SLOWED THE PROGRESS OF THE I CORPS OFFENSIVE. HOWEVER, THE INITIATIVE REMAINS WITH THE RVNAF AT THIS POINT, AND IN THE LONG RUN THIS REINFORCEMENT WILL FACILITATE HIS DESTRUCTION.

6. (TS) ON BALANCE, THROUGHOUT THE REPUBLIC THE TWO AREAS OF CONCERN ARE MR4 AND MR1 WHERE DECISIVE ACTIONS ARE NOW UNDERWAY. IN MR4, A MILITARY SPECTACULAR BY THE ENEMY APPEARS UNLIKELY. HOWEVER, IN THE LONGER TERM HIS SUCCESSFUL ESTABLISHMENT OF A SIGNIFICANT MILITARY PRESENCE IN THE VITAL AREA OF THE DELTA WITH ITS AGRICULTURAL AND POPULATION RESOURCES WOULD REPRESENT AN IMPORTANT REVERSE TO THE RVN. IN MR1, ALTHOUGH A MILITARY SPECTACULAR BY THE ENEMY REMAINS A POSSIBILITY, IT IS UNLIKELY THAT HE WILL BE ABLE TO PUT IT ALL TOGETHER IN SPITE OF HIS CLEAR INTENTION TO REINFORCE, ALTHOUGH HE CONTINUES MODERATE TO HEAVY ATTACKS BY FIRE.

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PERFORMANCE OF HIS INFANTRY IS POOR AND THERE ARE INDICATIONS THAT SUPPORTING HIS OPERATIONS IS BECOMING INCREASINGLY DIFFICULT NOT ONLY BECAUSE OF LOSSES FROM US FIRE SUPPORT, BUT BECAUSE OF SWOLLEN FORDS AND IMPASSABLE ROADS DUE TO INCREASING RAINFALL WHICH REPORTEDLY HAVE ADDED TO HIS PROBLEMS. THIS WAS PREDICTED IN EARLIER ASSESSMENTS AND SHOULD MILITATE IN FAVOR OF GVN OPERATIONS.

7. (TS) PLANNED US REDEPLOYMENTS TO MEET THE 1 SEPTEMBER CEILING OF 39,000 SPACES ARE PROCEEDING ON SCHEDULE. THE REDEPLOYMENT OF THE REMAINING US GROUND COMBAT UNITS, IN ORDER TO RETAIN THOSE ASSETS WHICH CONTRIBUTE TO CONTINUED USE OF US AIR AND NAVAL POWER AND SUPPORT TO RVNAF, WAS A NECESSARY RISK WHICH REMAINS A MATTER OF CONCERN. US AIR AND NAVAL POWER CONTINUES TO BE DECISIVE AND VITAL TO THE CONTINUATION OF THE GVN COUNTER OFFENSIVE.

8. (TS) IN SUMMARY, PROGRESS TOWARD GVN OBJECTIVES DURING THE PAST MONTH HAS BEEN STEADY. THE ENEMY CONTINUES ATTEMPTS TO PURSUE HIS OFFENSIVE WITHIN THE LIMITS OF HIS CAPABILITY. WITH CONTINUED US SUPPORT AT THE CURRENT LEVEL, THE GVN SHOULD BE ABLE TO MAINTAIN THE INITIATIVE AND REACT TO ANTICIPATED ENEMY MOVES.
GCS 1982.

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ANNOTES

NMCC/MC REFERENCE AND ROUTE

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90871
SECT 79 OF 90320

ACTION
DISTR NHCCIMC() FILE(1)
(201)

TRANSIT/ Z/070147Z/ I TOR2200130
DE RHMSMVA #9803 2200130
ZNY AAAAA
9 060130Z AUG 72
FM COMUSMACV
BT

CORRECTION TO 90320

SPECAT-EXCLUSIVE

TOP SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE SVQ
ZUI RHMSMVA9760 0 061210Z AUG 72 X
CORRECT PAGE 6 LINE 5 TO READ AS FOLLOWS:
"BUT MUST BE WATCHED, IN THE QUANG TRI/THUA TIEN AREA THE"
THAT IS TIEN VICE TINH
GDS 1982
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ANNOTES
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ACTION J3(ADM KING) (01) 1

DISTR CJCS(ADM MOORER) (06) 2-7 DJS (GEN SEIGNIOUS) (02) 8-9

OPR FILE (01) 10

(010)

TRANSIT/062018Z/062023Z/000105GRP0673

DE RUEKAAA #0543 2192023

ZNY AAAAA

O 062018Z AUG 72 ZFF6

FM JCS

TO RUHHHQA/CINCPAC

INFO RUHHABA/CINCPACAF

RUHHBRA/CINCPACFLT

BT -

TOP SECRET SPECAT EXCLUSIVE 5195

SECTION 1 OF 2

FOR ADM MCCAIN, INFO GEN CLAY, ADM CLAREY,

CJCS SENDS

DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS

J1 LINE BACKER TARGETS (U)

REFS: A, CINCPAC 030519Z AUG 72, B, CINCPAC 030547Z AUG 72,

C, 7AF 031100Z AUG 72, D, COMUSMACV 031151Z AUG 72, E, JCS 3851/

241905Z JUN 72,

1, REF A RECONFIRMS PRIORITY OF NE/NW RAIL LINE INTERDICTION,
 REF B ADDRESSES PLANS FOR B-52 STRIKE OPERATIONS IN NORTHERN NVN,
 REF C, AMONG OTHER THINGS, ASSESSES STATUS OF NE RAIL LINE, REF D
 REAFFIRMS CONTINUING REQUIREMENT FOR MAXIMUM B-52 SUPPORT OF
 BATTLE IN RVN, REF E VALIDATES SELECTED TARGETS IN NORTHERN NVN FOR
 B-52 STRIKES.

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CTIC. I HAVE FOLLOWED THE DIALOGUE AS EXPRESSED IN REFS, A THRU D WITH INTEREST. YOU SHOULD NOTE THAT THE PICTURE AS SEEN FROM HERE IS THAT A DISPROPORTIONATE SHARE OF THE AIR EFFORT IS PROGRAMMED IN THE NVN PANHANDLE AT THE EXPENSE OF TARGETS IN THE NORTHERN ROUTE PACKAGES. TO ILLUSTRATE MY POINT, LESS THAN 25 PERCENT OF THE VALIDATED TARGETS IN RP V AND VI HAVE BEEN STRUCK. I RECOGNIZE THAT MANY VALIDATED TARGETS MAY NEVER BE STRUCK FOR EXCELLENT REASONS. NONETHELESS, ONLY 74 NEW TARGETS WERE STRUCK DURING JULY. THE JULY TOTALS INCLUDING RESTRIKES SHOW ONLY 5 TARGETS WERE STRUCK IN RP V, 48 IN RP VIA AND 172 IN RP VIB, WHILE THE NEED FOR STRONG INTERDICTION OPERATIONS IN THE LOWER ROUTE PACKAGES IS CERTAINLY APPRECIATED, THE LIMITED WEIGHT OF EFFORT AGAINST KEY TARGETS IN THE NORTHERN AREA OF NVN RAISES QUESTIONS AS TO WHETHER WE ARE HOLDING TO OUR PRIORITIES.

3. THEREFORE, IT APPEARS WE MUST INCREASE OUR OVERALL EFFORTS IN THE NORTH BY REFINING OUR CONCEPT OF OPERATION EVERY WAY POSSIBLE FOR MAXIMUM IMPACT ON THE ENEMY. FOR INSTANCE, WE MUST MAKE FULLEST USE OF ALL THE VISUAL DAYLIGHT FLYING WEATHER, ALTHOUGH MORNING STRIKES LEAVE MORE TIME FOR SAR, A DOUBLE OR TRIPLE PUNCH IN ONE DAY MAY WELL FIND THE ENEMY IN CONFUSION WITH HIS DEFENSES DEGRADED AND LOWER OUR OVERALL LOSSES, AS INCLEMENT WEATHER BECOMES MORE OF A FACTOR, WE MUST USE MORE ALL-WEATHER

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BOMBING TECHNIQUES. FOR EXAMPLE, WHILE THE CVA A-6 IS NOW BEING
USED EXTENSIVELY UP NORTH, I WISH TO EMPHASIZE THE VALUE IN USING
THIS AIRCRAFT TO CONTINUE HARASSMENT OF THE ENEMY AT NIGHT AND
DURING PERIODS WHEN WEATHER PREVENTS VISUAL BOMBING. I AM SURE YOU
AGREE IT WILL PAY DIVIDENDS TO EXPLOIT TO THE FULLEST THE UNIQUE
CAPABILITY OF THE A-6 IN BOTH AN ALPHA STRIKE AND ARMED RECONNAIS-
SANCE ROLE. THIS EFFORT SHOULD CONTINUE INVOLVING ALL A-6 ASSETS.
IN THIS REGARD, I NOTE THE NAM PHONG MARINE A-6 AIRCRAFT ARE
LARGELY OPERATING IN MR-1 DURING DAYLIGHT HOURS, USING THE MARINE
ALL-WEATHER CAPABILITY IN RP I WOULD COMPOUND THE ENEMY'S PROBLEMS
IN THIS REAR SUPPORT AREA AND SHOULD FREE SOME USAF SORTIES FOR USE
IN THE NORTHERN ROUTE PACKAGES. WE ALSO HAVE AN EXCELLENT ALL-
WEATHER SYSTEM WITH THE LORAN F-4 AND MORE EXTENSIVE APPLICATIONS
SHOULD BE POSSIBLE IN NVN. THIS WILL BE THE SUBJECT OF A SUBSE-
QUENT MESSAGE. FINALLY, I AM OPTIMISTIC THAT THE F-111 DEPLOYMENT
WILL BE APPROVED FOR SEPTEMBER. THE F-111 SHOULD GREATLY ASSIST IN
OUR EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE AN ALL-WEATHER PRESENCE IN THE NORTHERN
ROUTE PACKAGES.

4. DURING PERIODS WHEN GOOD FLYING WEATHER IS FORECAST OVER ALL
OF NVN, THE ARMED RECONNAISSANCE EFFORT IN THE NVN PANHANDLE SHOULD
BE SHIFTED TO BOMBING IN RP V, VIA, AND VIB. AS A GENERAL RULE,

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5195

SECTION 2 OF 5195

TRANSIT/062018Z/062025Z/000107GRP0392
 RUEKAAA #0544 2192025
 NY AAAAA
 062018Z AUG 72 ZFF6
 PM JCS
 RUHHHQA/CINCPAC
 INFO RUHHABA/CINCPACAF
 RUHHBRA/CINCPACFLT
 JT

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TOP SECRET SPECIAL EXCLUSIVE 5195
 SECTION 2 OF 2

SCHEDULING A MINIMAL EFFORT IN RP I THROUGH IV WHEN THE WEATHER IS
 GOOD IN THE NORTH, WOULD ALLOW FOR A SUBSTANTIAL EFFORT AGAINST THE
 MORE LUCRATIVE RP V-VI TARGETS. TO OFFSET UNEXPECTED BAD WEATHER
 IN THE NORTHERN ROUTE PACKAGES, STRIKES IN THE LOWER ROUTE PACKAGES
 WOULD BE SCHEDULED AS WEATHER ALTERNATES.

5. A FURTHER SOURCE OF CONCERN HERE IS THE APPARENT
 DISPROPORTIONATE EFFORT BEING MADE THROUGHOUT NVN IN ARMED
 RECONNAISSANCE OPERATIONS AS OPPOSED TO STRIKES AGAINST
 VALID FIXED TARGETS. IT IS RECOGNIZED THAT CERTAIN SORTIES
 PRESENTLY BEING REPORTED AS ARMED RECONNAISSANCE ACTUALLY
 INCLUDE STRIKES AGAINST BE-NUMBERED TARGETS. HOWEVER, THE
 REPORTS DO NOT REFLECT THESE STRIKES AND THE IMPRESSION THERE-
 FORE, IS THAT OUR ARMED RECONNAISSANCE OPERATIONS ARE NOT
 CAREFULLY DEVELOPED, ADDING TO THIS MISCONCEPTION, IS THE

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ACT THAT, IN SOME CASES, SPECIFIC ROUTE SEGMENTS AGAINST
WHICH ARMED RECONNAISSANCE IS COMMITTED ARE NOT IDENTIFIED
THE OPERATIONAL REPORTS, THESE CONCERNS CAN BE CORRECTED
MINOR CHANGES TO OUR REPORTING PROCEDURES, FIRST, SPECIFIC
ROUTE SEGMENTS SHOULD BE FRAGGED AND REPORTED AGAINST ARMED
RECONNAISSANCE MISSIONS, SECOND, SORTIES ASSIGNED
SPECIFICALLY AGAINST HARD TARGETS SHOULD NOT BE LISTED AS
ARMED RECONNAISSANCE, THIRD, WHEN BE-NUMBERED TARGETS ARE HIT
IDENT TO ARMED RECONNAISSANCE MISSIONS, THEY SHOULD BE SO
EDITED IN THE OPERATIONAL REPORTS,
6, LASTLY, IN REFERENCE TO YOUR PLANS FOR B-52 STRIKES, I AGREE
THEY CAN BE EMPLOYED PROFITABLY IN NVN AGAINST ANY OF THE TAR-
S SPECIFIED IN REF E OR AGAINST AIRFIELDS, IN ADDITION TO THE
NIFICANT MILITARY RESULTS, PERIODIC B-52 RAIDS INTO THE NVN
RTLAND WOULD FORCEFULLY DEMONSTRATE THE SERIOUSNESS OF OUR INTEN-
S TO THE HANOI LEADERSHIP, I WILL CONTINUE TO FORCEFULLY
SENT THESE VIEWS TO HIGHER AUTHORITY, WARM REGARDS, XGDS 3,

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No Objection To Declassification in Full 2011/04/28 : LOC-HAK-244-14-5-0
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ADV DISTR: CJCS(ADM MOORER)(06)1-6 NMCC:DDO(01)7 FILE(01)8
SUBJ TO RELEASE BY CJCS: ADV CY: DJS(GEN SEIGNIOUS,II)(01)9
ADV CY: J3(ADM KING)(01)10

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O 090225Z AUG 72

FM CINCPAC

TO RHMSMVA/COMUSMACV SAIGONRVN

RUHHBRA/CINCPACFLT MAKALAPA HI

RUHHABA/CINCPACAF HICKAM AFB HI

RHCOAAA/CINCSAC OFFUTT AFB NEB

INFO RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHDC

RUMRSA/CMR 7AF SGN RVN

RUHGAAA/COMSEVENTHFLT

RUMFRBA/CTF 77

BT

~~TOP SECRET~~ SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GENERAL WEYAND, ADMIRAL CLAREY, GENERAL CLAY AND
GENERAL MEYER INFO ADMIRAL MOORER, GENERAL VOGT, VADM HOLLOWAY AND
RADM FLANAGAN FROM ADMIRAL MCCAIN

DELIVER DURING WAKING HOURS ONLY

LINEBACKER OPERATIONS (U)

1. (TS) WE ARE NOW APPROACHING OUR FOURTH MONTH OF LINEBACKER AIR
OPERATIONS AGAINST NORTH VIETNAM. OUR ACHIEVEMENTS IN DISRUPTING THE
ENEMY TRANSPORTATION AND SUPPLY DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM HAVE BEEN SUBSTANTIAL.

IMMEDIATE

SPECAT-EXCLUSIVE

CSA	✓
CSAF	✓
CNO	✓
CMC	✓
DJS	✓
J-1	
J-2	
J-3	✓
J-4	
J-5	
J-6	
SD	
DSD	
ISA	
WH	
ST	
CIA	
O1	01E
O2	01F
O1A	01G
O1B	01H
O1C	05
O1D	03

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DESTRUCTION OF LINES OF COMMUNICATION HAS SERVED POSITIVELY TO DENY RAPID, EFFICIENT MOVEMENT OF WAR-MAKING MATERIALS TO THE SOUTH AND HAS CAUSED HANOI TO REORDER PRIORITIES IN THE TASKING OF CRITICAL HOME-FRONT MANPOWER RESERVES. THE MAJORITY OF NVN POWER GENERATING FACILITIES HAVE BEEN RENDERED INOPERATIVE WITH LITTLE PROBABILITY OF SHORT-TERM REPAIR. INTERDICTION OF TRANSSHIPMENT POINTS, POL STORAGE, MILITARY SUPPLY SITES, AND FLEETING TARGETS HAS RESULTED IN SIGNIFICANT BDA. IN GENERAL, WE SAY THAT MUCH HAS BEEN ACCOMPLISHED. HOWEVER, THE ENEMY CONTINUES TO PURSUE HIS GOALS IN RVN, AND THERE IS MUCH LEFT TO BE DONE.

(TS) IN THIS LIGHT, I THINK IT APPROPRIATE TO EXAMINE ANEW THE BROAD ARRAY OF AIR ACTIONS AGAINST NVN WITH A VIEW TOWARDS FURTHER REFINEMENT OF OUR CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS. THERE IS GROWING CONCERN HERE AND IN WASHINGTON THAT INSUFFICIENT EFFORT IS BEING APPLIED AGAINST THE NORTH VIETNAM HEARTLAND, I.E., RP FIVE AND SIX. THE DAILY SORTIE COUNT IN RP 1 THROUGH 4 APPEARS DISPROPORTIONATELY HIGH IN RELATION TO THE DAILY TOTALS BEING FLOWN IN NORTHERN NVN AS PERTAINS TO THE NUMBER AND RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF VALIDATED TARGETS IN THESE RESPECTIVE AREAS. WHILE RECOGNIZING RP 1 AS BEING A PRIME

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AR SUPPORT AREA FOR ENEMY FORCES OPERATING IN QUANG TRI PROVINCE

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ROUTINE BASIS. ALTHOUGH WEATHER HAS BEEN A FACTOR IN DIVERTING STRIKE
ASSETS FROM THE NORTHERN ROUTE PACKAGES TO THE NVN PANHANDLE, GREATER
EMPHASIS ON STRIKES AGAINST VALIDATED TARGETS IN THE NVN HEARTLAND
IS REQUIRED.

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3. (TS) TO ACCOMPLISH THE FOREGOING AND TO SIGNAL HANOI IN THE
STRONGEST WAY POSSIBLE THAT OUR AIR PRESENCE OVER THEIR COUNTRY WILL
NOT DIMINISH, I WISH TO INTENSIFY THE AIR CAMPAIGN IN NORTHERN NVN.
TO CARRY OUT THIS STEPPED-UP AIR EFFORT, I AM DIRECTING
THE FOLLOWING ACTIONS BE IMPLEMENTED UPON RECEIPT
OF THIS MESSAGE.

A. FOR CINCPACFLT:

(1) CONTINUE TO APPLY A THREE CVA TACAIR
STRIKE EFFORT TO LINEBACKER OPERATIONS AND
ENSURE THAT AT LEAST HALF OF THESE SORTIES ARE SCHEDULED
IN RP-6B AND, IF REQUESTED BY PACAF, IN RP-6A.

(2) CONTINUE TO APPLY THE MAXIMUM NUMBER OF

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A-6 AIRCRAFT FOR ROUND THE CLOCK OPERATIONS IN NVN WITH
ADDED EMPHASIS ON STRIKING THE NORTHERN ROUTE PACKS,
UTILIZING ALL-WEATHER CAPABILITIES AS REQUIRED.

(3) INVESTIGATE AND REPORT THE FEASIBILITY OF TEMPORARILY
INCREASING CVA A-6 ASSETS DURING THE NEXT FEW MONTHS

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THROUGH TRADE-OFF

AIRCRAFT.

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B. FOR CINCPACAF:

(1) APPLY A MINIMUM OF 48 STRIKE SORTIES PER DAY IN RP-5 AND 6A. THIS EFFORT SHOULD BE DIRECTED AGAINST FIXED PRIORITY TARGETS.

(2) SCHEDULE VISUAL STRIKE SORTIES THROUGHOUT THE DAYLIGHT HOURS TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF WEATHER WINDOWS THAT MAY OPEN DURING THE DAY WHEN WEATHER IS FORECAST BELOW VMC STRIKE MINIMUMS.

C. FOR COMUSMACV:

(1) INSURE ADEQUATE AIR RESOURCES ARE MADE AVAILABLE TO ATTAIN THE DESIRED TACAIR/ARC LIGHT WEIGHT OF EFFORT IN NORTHERN NVN, COMMENSURATE WITH CRITICAL SITUATIONS THAT MAY DEVELOP IN THE LAND BATTLE.

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(2) WITH THE COMPLETION OF RUNWAY LIGHTING AND PROGRAMMED IMPROVEMENT OF THE BASE POWER DISTRIBUTING SYSTEM, COMMENCE SCHEDULING THE USMC A-6 AIRCRAFT LOCATED AT NAM PHONG AGAINST TARGETS IN RP-1 UTILIZING THE FULL SYSTEMS OF THIS AIRCRAFT TO PERFORM THE NIGHT/ ALL WEATHER ATTACK ROLE. AS AIRCREW EXPERIENCE IS GAINED, THESE MARINE ASSETS MAY BEST BE UTILIZED IN RP 5 AND 6A. INTERIM EMPLOYMENT OF THE A-6 IN RP-1 WILL ALLOW THE RELEASE OF ADDITIONAL F-4 AIRCRAFT FROM RP-1 TO RP-5 AND 6A.

D. FOR CINCSAC: IT IS MY INTENTION TO SCHEDULE PERIODIC B-52

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STRIKES IN THE NORTH ROUTE BACKS OF NVN.

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E. FOR ALL:

(1) CONTINUE TO COORDINATE MUTUAL STRIKE AND SUPPORT EFFORTS THROUGH THE LINEBACKER COORDINATING COMMITTEE WITH FOCUS ON APPLYING A-6 ALL WEATHER STRIKE CAPABILITIES WHERE MOST NEEDED.

(2) SUBMIT COMMENTS/RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE INCREASED WEIGHT OF EFFORT IN RP 5, 6A, AND 6B AS OUTLINED IN PARA'S 3A (1), (2) AND 3B (1), (2) ABOVE. REQUEST THIS INFORMATION BE FORWARDED TO CINCPAC AFTER A TWO WEEK TRIAL.

(3) REVISED REPORTING INSTRUCTION CONCERNING STRIKE AND ARMED RECONNAISSANCE MISSIONS IN NVN WILL BE PROVIDED BY SEPARATE

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MESSAGE.

4. (U) WARMEST REGARDS.

GDS-82

BT

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ANNOTES

REQUEST DISTR INSTRUCTIONS FROM CJCS

MRC WMM

NNNN

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